Implementing safeguards to detect credentials in user inputs. For example, scanning user prompts and pasted content for API keys, access tokens, private keys, and connection strings using pattern-matching or entropy-based detection; defining handling procedures when detected such as warning the user, refusing to persist, or flagging to the deployer.

A008.1 Config: Secrets detection in user inputs

Code or configuration demonstrating input-side secrets detection. For example, regex patterns or detection libraries (e.g., detect-secrets, TruffleHog rulesets) scanning user prompts and pasted context, entropy-based detection for high-randomness strings, or integration with third-party secret detection APIs. Evidence should also show the defined handling response (e.g., user warning UI, rejection logic, or alert configuration).

Category

Technical Implementation

Eng: User LLM input filtering logic

Code-generation

Implementing safeguards to keep secrets out of generated code artifacts. For example, guiding the model via system prompts to reference environment variables or secret-management tools rather than hardcoding credentials, post-generation scanning of output files for common credential patterns, or blocking/flagging generations that contain detected secrets before they are written to disk.

A008.2 Config: Secrets handling in generated code

Code, configuration, or system prompt excerpt demonstrating secrets hygiene - may include system prompt guidance directing the model toward envvar or secret-store patterns, scanning logic applied to generated files, sample generations on credential-requiring prompts showing envvar references rather than literals, or block/flag logic preventing persistence of outputs containing detected secrets.

Category

Technical Implementation

Engineering Code

Code-generation

Implementing safeguards to securely store user-provided credentials to enable agent-connected services. For example, storing OAuth tokens, API keys, and connection strings in a dedicated secret manager, encrypting credentials at rest, scoping credential access per tool and per session, or fetching credentials only at the point of tool invocation rather than persisting them in the agent's context window.

A008.3 Config: Secure storage of user-provided credentials

Configuration showing secure handling of user-provided credentials — may include secret manager integration (e.g., AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, cloud-native KMS), encryption-at-rest configuration for credential storage, access scoping configuration limiting which tools or sessions can retrieve specific credentials, or code showing just-in-time credential fetching at tool-call time.

Category

Technical Implementation

Engineering CodeEngineering Practice

Code-generation

Implementing user-facing warnings when potential secrets are detected in user inputs. For example, alerting users when credentials are detected in their prompts.

A008.4 Documentation: User-facing warnings for detected secrets

Documentation of user-facing warnings when secrets are detected in inputs — may include user-facing documentation showing warning messages displayed when credentials are detected in user input before model inference.

Category

Operational Practices

Product

Code-generation

Implementing safeguards to prevent secrets from being retained in platform logs, conversation history, and stored artifacts. For example, redacting detected credential patterns before log storage, masking secrets in conversation history displayed to users or support staff, or applying scrubbing functions to prompts and outputs before persistence.

A008.5 Config: Secrets redaction in logs and stored artifacts

Code or configuration showing secrets redaction in stored data - may include log redaction rules alongside PII patterns (extending A006.1-style logic to credentials), masking logic applied to conversation storage, scrubbing functions in output persistence pipelines, or storage configuration showing sanitization before writes. Can be demonstrated alongside or as part of existing PII redaction controls.

Category

Technical Implementation

Engineering CodeLogs

Code-generation

Organizations can submit alternative evidence demonstrating how they meet the requirement.

AIUC-1 is built with industry leaders

"We need a SOC 2 for AI agents— a familiar, actionable standard for security and trust."

Phil Venables

Former CISO of Google Cloud

"Integrating MITRE ATLAS ensures AI security risk management tools are informed by the latest AI threat patterns and leverage state of the art defensive strategies."

Dr. Christina Liaghati

MITRE ATLAS lead

"Built on the latest advances in AI research, AIUC-1 empowers organizations to identify, assess, and mitigate AI risks with confidence."

Prof. Sanmi Koyejo

Lead for Stanford Trustworthy AI Research

"AIUC-1standardizes how AI is adopted. That's powerful."

John Bautista

Partner at Orrick

AIUC-1 Standard

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A. Data & Privacy

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A008. Prevent leakage of credentials and secrets

A008