AIUC-1
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Standard
A. Data & Privacy
B. Security
Third-party testing of adversarial robustnessDetect adversarial inputManage public release of technical detailsPrevent AI endpoint scrapingImplement real-time input filteringPrevent unauthorized AI agent actionsEnforce user access privileges to AI systemsProtect AI system deployment environmentLimit output over-exposure
C. Safety
D. Reliability
E. Accountability
F. Society
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AIUC-1 Standard
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B. Security
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B003. Manage public release of technical details
B003

Manage public release of technical details

Implement controls to prevent over-disclosure of technical information about AI systems and organizational details that could enable adversarial targeting

Keywords

Public DisclosureOpen-SourceExternal Threats

Application

Optional

Frequency

Every 12 months

Type

Preventative

Crosswalks

MITRE ATLAS
AML-M0000: Limit Public Release of Information
AML-M0001: Limit Model Artifact Release
OWASP Top 10
LLM02:25 - Sensitive Information Disclosure
LLM07:25 - System Prompt Leakage
CSA AICM
AIS-09: Output Validation
AIS-15: Prompt Differentiation
IBM AI Risk Atlas
IBM 42: Inference - Extraction attack
IBM 47: Inference - Prompt leaking
Cisco AI Security Framework
AITech-10.2: Model Inversion

Control activities

Typical evidence

Documenting limitations on technical information release. For example, limiting public disclosure of model architectures, algorithms, training data details, system configurations, and performance metrics, requiring approval before sharing technical specifications or implementation details.
Controlling organizational information to balance transparency with security. For example, limiting disclosure of AI team details, development timelines, and other information that could reveal technical capabilities, reviewing public communications for sensitive information.
B003.1 Documentation: Technical information disclosure guidelines

Policy document, SOP, or handbook section defining limitations and approval requirements for publicly sharing AI system technical details - may include communication policy limiting disclosure of model architectures or configurations, engineering handbook with approval workflows for technical specifications, or internal procedures controlling release of organizational AI information.

Category

Operational Practices
Internal policies
Universal
Establishing approval processes. For example, requiring designated review for public content referencing AI capabilities in e.g. publications, presentations, and marketing materials, and documenting approved disclosures with business justification.
B003.2 Documentation: Public disclosure approval records

Approval email, ticket, or review documentation for public AI communications - may include approval requests in email or Jira/Slack for blog posts or press releases, marketing review records for AI capability disclosures, or periodic security review logs for public-facing AI content.

Category

Operational Practices
Internal processes
Universal

Organizations can submit alternative evidence demonstrating how they meet the requirement.

AIUC-1 is built with industry leaders

Phil Venables

"We need a SOC 2 for AI agents— a familiar, actionable standard for security and trust."

Google Cloud
Phil Venables
Former CISO of Google Cloud
Dr. Christina Liaghati

"Integrating MITRE ATLAS ensures AI security risk management tools are informed by the latest AI threat patterns and leverage state of the art defensive strategies."

MITRE
Dr. Christina Liaghati
MITRE ATLAS lead
Hyrum Anderson

"Today, enterprises can't reliably assess the security of their AI vendors— we need a standard to address this gap."

Cisco
Hyrum Anderson
Senior Director, Security & AI
Prof. Sanmi Koyejo

"Built on the latest advances in AI research, AIUC-1 empowers organizations to identify, assess, and mitigate AI risks with confidence."

Stanford
Prof. Sanmi Koyejo
Lead for Stanford Trustworthy AI Research
John Bautista

"AIUC-1standardizes how AI is adopted. That's powerful."

Orrick
John Bautista
Partner at Orrick
Lena Smart

"An AIUC-1certificate enables me to sign contracts much faster— it's a clear signal I can trust."

SecurityPal
Lena Smart
Head of Trust for SecurityPal and former CISO of MongoDB