AIUC-1
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Standard
A. Data & Privacy
B. Security
C. Safety
D. Reliability
E. Accountability
AI failure plan for security breachesAI failure plan for harmful outputsAI failure plan for hallucinationsAssign accountabilityDocument data storage securityConduct vendor due diligence[Retired] Document system change approvalsReview internal processesMonitor third-party accessEstablish AI acceptable use policyRecord processing locationsDocument regulatory complianceImplement quality management system[Retired] Share transparency reportsLog AI system activityImplement AI disclosure mechanismsDocument system transparency policy
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Evidence overview
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The Security, Safety, and Reliability standard for AI agents

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AIUC-1 Standard
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E. Accountability
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E009. Monitor third-party access
E009

Monitor third-party access

Implement systems to monitor third party access

Keywords

AccessLogins

Application

Mandatory

Frequency

Every 12 months

Type

Preventative

Crosswalks

MITRE ATLAS
AML-M0024: AI Telemetry Logging
EU AI Act
Article 72: Post-Market Monitoring by Providers and Post-Market Monitoring Plan for High-Risk AI Systems
NIST AI RMF
GOVERN 1.5: Risk monitoring and review
MANAGE 4.1: Post-deployment monitoring
OWASP Top 10
LLM03:25 - Supply Chain
LLM05:25 - Improper Output Handling
LLM06:25 - Excessive Agency
LLM10:25 - Unbounded Consumption
CSA AICM
AIS-10: API Security
LOG-05: Audit Logs Monitoring and Response
UEM-14: Third-Party Endpoint Security Posture
TVM-05: External Library Vulnerabilities
OWASP AIVSS
Agent Supply Chain and Dependency Risk
IBM AI Risk Atlas
IBM 3: Agentic AI - Sharing IP/PI/confidential information with tools
IBM 6: Agentic AI - Attack on AI agents’ external resources
IBM 7: Agentic AI - Unauthorized use
Cisco AI Security Framework
AITech-1.2: Indirect Prompt Injection
AITech-3.1: Masquerading / Obfuscation / Impersonation
AITech-4.1: Agent Injection
AITech-7.3: Data Source Abuse and Manipulation
AITech-9.1: Model or Agentic System Manipulation
AITech-9.3: Dependency / Plugin Compromise
AITech-12.1: Tool Exploitation
AITech-14.1: Unauthorized Access
AITech-16.1: Eavesdropping

Control activities

Typical evidence

Configuring logging for third-party interactions. For example, capturing API connections, user access sessions, data exchanges, and service integrations.
Capturing access metadata. For example, user identification, authentication timestamps, accessed resources, session duration, origin IP addresses, and resource usage patterns.
E009.1 Config: Third-party access monitoring

Logging system or SIEM configuration showing third-party interactions being monitored with captured metadata - may include cloud logging interface (Google Cloud Logging, AWS CloudWatch, Azure Monitor) showing logged API requests with timestamps/IPs/user agents, access logs capturing authentication events and resource access, or SIEM dashboard displaying third-party connection monitoring with relevant metadata fields.

Category

Technical Implementation
Engineering Tooling
Universal

Organizations can submit alternative evidence demonstrating how they meet the requirement.

AIUC-1 is built with industry leaders

Phil Venables

"We need a SOC 2 for AI agents— a familiar, actionable standard for security and trust."

Google Cloud
Phil Venables
Former CISO of Google Cloud
Dr. Christina Liaghati

"Integrating MITRE ATLAS ensures AI security risk management tools are informed by the latest AI threat patterns and leverage state of the art defensive strategies."

MITRE
Dr. Christina Liaghati
MITRE ATLAS lead
Hyrum Anderson

"Today, enterprises can't reliably assess the security of their AI vendors— we need a standard to address this gap."

Cisco
Hyrum Anderson
Senior Director, Security & AI
Prof. Sanmi Koyejo

"Built on the latest advances in AI research, AIUC-1 empowers organizations to identify, assess, and mitigate AI risks with confidence."

Stanford
Prof. Sanmi Koyejo
Lead for Stanford Trustworthy AI Research
John Bautista

"AIUC-1standardizes how AI is adopted. That's powerful."

Orrick
John Bautista
Partner at Orrick
Lena Smart

"An AIUC-1certificate enables me to sign contracts much faster— it's a clear signal I can trust."

SecurityPal
Lena Smart
Head of Trust for SecurityPal and former CISO of MongoDB